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Square Pegs, Round Hole: The Fourth Amendment 
and Preflight Searches of Airline Passengers  
in a Post-9/11 World 
I. INTRODUCTION 
September 11, 2001 marked a day of tragedy on which 
thousands of people lost their lives. As a result, the dangers of 
hijacking became a heightened subject of concern for America. The 
detection and detention of would-be hijackers is now a greater 
priority than in prior times, and the government has implemented 
many new measures—such as increased security at airports—to 
accomplish this goal.1 However, these increased security measures,2 
 
 1. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began requiring airline carriers to 
conduct screenings of all passengers and inspections of all carry-on items beginning in 1973.  
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.6(a), at 280–81 (2004). Security measures 
in airports increased beginning with the Aviation Transportation Security Act (ATSA) enacted 
by Congress on November 19, 2001 as a response to the tragic events of 9/11. Id. at 281–82. 
Therein, Congress federalized the inspection process and created the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), charging it with responsibility for “security in all modes of 
transportation,” including airlines and other modes. Id. at 282; 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(d) (West 
2004). In an attempt to detect previously permitted objects like the small knives and box 
cutters carried on board and used as weapons by the 9/11 hijackers, the ATSA set forth new, 
“considerably more intrusive and intensive [screening procedures] than those earlier mandated 
by the FAA.” 5 LAFAVE, supra, at 281–82 (citing Andrew Hessick, The Federalization of 
Airport Security: Privacy Implications, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 43, 43 (2002)). These procedures 
included examination of checked baggage for explosives through the use of dog sniffs, bomb-
scan machines, and manual searches; closer inspection of passengers; and possible searches of 
carry-on bags at boarding gates, all in addition to searches performed at the primary security 
checkpoint. Id. at 282 (citing Hessick, supra, at 52; Brett Andrew Skean, Comment, The 
Fourth Amendment and the New Face of Terrorism: How September 11th Could Change the Way 
America Flies, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 567, 585 (2002)).  
 2. Additional security procedures or technologies currently used in preflight searches or 
that foreseeably may be used include biological/chemical detectors, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., 
OUR SECURITY STRATEGY 1 (2006), http://www.tsa.gov/approach/layered_strategy.shtm; 
trace portals or “puffers,” which expel strong puffs of air onto passengers’ bodies in order to 
dislodge and then analyze trace particles for explosives contents, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., supra, 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/puffers.shtm; biometrics, including fingerprint 
identification and retinal scans, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., supra, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/ 
tech/biometrics.shtm; millimeter wave and X-ray backscatter technologies, which would 
enable inspections officials to see through passengers’ clothing to detect weapons, see Marilyn 
Adams, Most Flyers Accept Intrusion in the Name of Security, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2006-09-06-accepting-intrusions_x.htm; 
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often in the form of precautionary, suspicionless searches made 
without warrants, lead to a hard question regarding personal privacy 
and the right to travel. Are these preflight passenger searches 
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment?3 
This Comment shows that a new Fourth Amendment approach 
is necessary to justify warrantless preflight searches of passengers 
boarding airliners because the prevailing approach is based on the 
misapplication of a set of exceptions to the Warrant Clause in the 
Fourth Amendment.4 Part II outlines how the history culminating in 
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment shows the need for judicial 
review of government search decisions and that a warrant-preference 
standard should be applied in determining which searches and 
seizures are constitutional under the Amendment. Part III discusses 
how courts have misapplied exceptions to the warrant requirement—
including the stop-and-frisk exception, the consent exception, the 
Katz privacy balancing test, and the border search exception—in 
attempts to justify preflight passenger searches, and explains why 
these attempts ultimately fail. Part IV calls for the creation of a sui 
generis exception to the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment 
that resolves the irrationality and inconsistency in the courts’ current 
justification of the searches. In addition to creating a rational 
justification for the searches, this approach would allow security in 
airline travel while being narrowly tailored to ensure that searches 
necessary to public safety are not misapplied to other situations in 
conflict with individual constitutional rights. 
 
 
Jonathan Duffy, The Future of Airport Security, BBC NEWS ONLINE, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/magazine/3263343.stm (last visited October 18, 2006); and thermal imaging, see id. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 4. Other commentators have also concluded that the presently existing exceptions to 
the warrant requirement do not justify preflight or mass transit searches. See generally The 
Constitutionality of Airport Searches, 72 MICH. L. REV. 128 (1973) [hereinafter Airport 
Searches]; Charles J. Keeley III, Note, Subway Searches: Which Exception to the Warrant and 
Probable Cause Requirements Applies to Suspicionless Searches of Mass Transit Passengers To 
Prevent Terrorism?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3231 (2006). 
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The language of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is 
inherently ambiguous.5 While the Amendment specifically forbids 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,”6 it outlines parameters for 
proper search warrants but does not specifically describe when such 
warrants are required. As a result, some authorities have argued that 
a warrant-preference standard is not required by the Fourth 
Amendment and that only a general reasonableness standard is 
required to determine the constitutionality of searches and seizures.7 
However, this Part will outline how the history culminating in the 
Fourth Amendment demonstrates the importance of judicial review 
of searches by law enforcement officials—and consequently a 
warrant-preference standard—in the Amendment. 
 
 5. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.1(a), at 8 (“The Fourth Amendment, it has been aptly 
noted, has ‘both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity.’ It does not define the critical 
word ‘unreasonable,’ nor does it indicate what the relationship is between that part prohibiting 
unreasonable searches and that part setting forth the conditions under which warrants may 
issue.” (citations omitted) (quoting J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME 
COURT 42 (1966))). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 7. Although the general reasonableness standard has gained increasing acceptance, 
Professor Thomas Y. Davies argues that while neither the reasonableness nor the warrant-
preference construction “adheres to the historical meaning” of the clause, “the warrant-
preference construction is more faithful to the Framers’ concerns than the generalized-
reasonableness construction. In fact, the latter is nearly the antithesis of the Framers’ 
understanding.” Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. 
REV. 547, 550 (1999). Either way, “the Supreme Court has not cleared the deck of many of 
its rulings from the earlier era.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
191–92 (2002). Thus, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence today reflects both the “warrant 
requirement and exceptions” paradigm and the reasonableness paradigm, leading to rulings 
such as those concerning preflight searches, which often feature the reasoning of and tension 
between both paradigms. See, e.g., Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980) (analyzing 
preflight search under three rationales: expectation of privacy, consent, and general 
reasonableness). 
  This Comment does not propose a complete discussion on this topic. For a greater 
discussion on the tension been the general reasonableness construction and the warrant-
preference construction, see generally DRESSLER, supra, at 183–92; Davies, supra. For the 
argument that a warrant-preference standard is required by the Fourth Amendment, see, for 
example, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the 
Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1492–98 (1985); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure 
for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994). For the 
opposing view, see, for example, Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 
(1994); Bradley, supra, at 1481–91. 
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In many ways, the Fourth Amendment is one of the most vague 
provisions in the Bill of Rights. The phrasing of the Fourth 
Amendment creates problems with its practical application because 
the Amendment does not give guidelines to determine which 
searches and seizures must be made pursuant to a warrant.8 The 
problem comes, in part, because the “warrant” clause of the 
Amendment is not directly tied to the “reasonable” clause. While the 
Fourth Amendment begins by stating, “The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”9 and ends 
by stating that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,”10 it 
never directly states that a warrant is a requirement for a reasonable 
governmental search and seizure.11 Thus, because the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures”12 and 
does not technically preclude “reasonable” searches made without a 
warrant,13 some scholars and judges have proposed that the 
constitutionality of searches and seizures should be determined 
according to a general “reasonableness” standard.14 
However, such an approach is short-sighted in light of the 
purpose and history of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment, 
like the other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, is 
inherently tied to its history, and this history has been very important 
to the Supreme Court when interpreting the Amendment. 
Commenting on the Framers’ intentions when they penned the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Chimel v. California 
stated, “The [Fourth] Amendment was in large part a reaction to the 
 
 8. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.1(a), at 8 & n.22. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (“[W]hat the Constitution 
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Amar, supra note 7, at 801–11; Bradley, supra note 7, at 1471. 
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general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the 
colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence.”15 
The Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States specifically 
acknowledged the importance of the history leading to the adoption 
of the Fourth Amendment.16 The Court noted that in colonial times, 
it was the practice of the British to employ writs of assistance in their 
efforts to enforce taxation in their colonies.17 Writs enabled a 
revenue officer, acting solely within his discretion, to search for 
smuggled goods in suspected places.18 In February, 1761, in Boston, 
James Otis spoke out against this practice, calling it “the worst 
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty 
and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an 
English law-book” because it put “the liberty of every man in the 
hands of every petty officer.”19 Otis made his speech in Boston in 
February 1761, during a famous political debate that was perhaps the 
most effective event in creating support for the Revolutionary War.20 
John Adams later commented on Otis’s speech: “Then and there was 
the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of 
Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.”21 
In light of the Fourth Amendment’s history, it is small wonder 
that the Amendment includes stipulations against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”22 In addition to prohibiting 
unreasonableness, the Fourth Amendment has long been read to 
presume that reasonable searches be made pursuant to warrants,23 
“supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”24 The 
 
 15. 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (citations omitted). For a greater discussion on the 
history culminating in the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, see generally Davies, supra 7, 
at 547. 
 16. 116 U.S. 616, 625–27 (1886). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 303 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1868)). 
 20. Id. at 625. 
 21. Id. (citations omitted). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 23. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Bradley, supra note 7, at 
1492–98; Maclin, supra note 7, at 20–21. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire summarized the 
foundation for this warrant-preference standard when it stated, 
“[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specially established and well-
delineated exceptions.’”25 These exceptions are “jealously and 
carefully drawn,”26 and require “a showing by those who seek 
exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course 
imperative.”27 
The Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions to 
the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Examples of such 
exceptions include searches made on United States borders,28 stop-
and-frisk searches by police officers,29 searches made incident to 
arrest,30 searches based on probable cause made in “hot pursuit” or 
exigent circumstances,31 “special needs” searches,32 sobriety 
checkpoint stops,33 administrative searches,34 and searches made with 
valid consent.35 In addition, a warrantless search may be reasonable 
where the court determines an individual either does not have an 
actual or subjective expectation of privacy or that an individual’s 
subjective expectation of privacy is not one society is willing to 
accept as reasonable.36 
 
 25. 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357). 
 26. Id. at 455 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)). 
 27. Id. (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). 
 28. E.g., United States. v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977). 
 29. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
 30. E.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
 31. E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). 
 32. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 
709, 720 (plurality opinion) (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). 
 33. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 34. E.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 
U.S. 523, 531–32, 538 (1967).  
 35. E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558–60 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–
49 (1973). 
 36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also 
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725–26 (1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that in the 
context of work-related intrusions and “investigations of work-related misconduct[,]” 
government interests in proper and efficient workplace operations outweigh government 
employees’ privacy interests in their place of work); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 
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In review, the practical application of the language of the Fourth 
Amendment is not inherently clear because the Amendment does 
not explicitly designate warrantless searches as unreasonable. An 
approach that would reduce the Fourth Amendment to a 
reasonableness balancing test is short-sighted because the history of 
the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was adopted 
to prevent the government discretion that such a balancing approach 
would permit. However, the Supreme Court has allowed for the 
creation of carefully reasoned exceptions to the warrant requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
III. HOW EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT CLAUSE IN THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT HAVE BEEN MISAPPLIED IN ATTEMPTS  
TO INCLUDE PREFLIGHT PASSENGER SEARCHES 
While United States courts have sought to justify preflight 
searches of passengers under the Fourth Amendment since the early 
1970s,37 the courts have never reached a single, unified justification 
for preflight passenger searches.38 However, United States courts 
have attempted to apply certain widely accepted exceptions to the 
Warrant Clause in misguided attempts to justify preflight passenger 
searches. 
Courts have used four widely accepted exceptions to the Warrant 
Clause in the Fourth Amendment to justify preflight passenger 
searches: the Terry stop-and-frisk exception, the consent exception,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1984) (holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their individual 
cells). 
 37. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 754 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
 38. See United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
S. Ct. 111 (2006) (then-Judge Alito, writing for the Third Circuit, acknowledged that “courts 
have not settled on a single framework for analyzing warrantless searches at airport 
checkpoints”).  
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the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy exception, and the border 
search exception.39 This Part will explain how these four exceptions 
 
 39. In addition to the four exceptions to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment 
that will be discussed below, some may attempt to analogize other recognized, but less 
applicable, exceptions (e.g. searches made incident to arrest, searches based on probable cause 
when in exigent circumstances, sobriety checkpoint stops, administrative searches, and “special 
needs” searches). These analogies are either facially improper or are based upon “exceptions” 
to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment which are really tacit applications of a general 
reasonableness standard that is incompatible with the Amendment’s warrant preference. 
  Searches made incident to arrest cannot be logically analogized to preflight 
passenger searches because in almost every preflight passenger search, no probable cause to 
arrest the passenger exists prior to the search. The “incident to arrest” exception requires, of 
course, probable cause to arrest. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973) (“It is 
sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest the petitioner and that he lawfully 
effectuated the arrest and placed the petitioner in custody.”). 
  Searches based on probable cause made in “hot pursuit” or exigent circumstances 
cannot be logically analogized because in almost every preflight passenger search, no probable 
cause exists to suggest that a passenger possesses contraband materials prior to the search. In 
addition, truly exigent circumstances do not exist because officers are not in “hot pursuit” of 
the airline passengers they are searching. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297–99 (1967) 
(holding a warrantless search of a house constitutional due to the “exigencies of the situation” 
and stating that “[s]peed . . . was essential” because the officers had probable cause to believe 
the suspect had committed an armed robbery and then entered the house less than five 
minutes before the search was made (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 
(1948))). 
  Sobriety checkpoint stops cannot be logically analogized to preflight passenger 
searches because while sobriety checkpoints involve suspicionless stopping, questioning, and 
observing motorists, actual searches are likely to be permitted only upon individualized 
suspicion. See Mich. Dep’t State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450–51, 455 (1990) (holding 
that a suspicionless initial stop of motorists at a sobriety checkpoint and “the associated 
preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers” does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment, but “[d]etention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing 
may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard” (citation omitted)); cf. City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34–42 (2000) (striking down program utilizing 
warrantless, suspicionless vehicle stops because the primary purpose of the program (drug 
interdiction) was insufficient to be excepted from “the general rule that a seizure must be 
accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion”). 
  Some might argue that preflight passenger searches are justified under the 
administrative search exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has, in dicta, spoken approvingly of preflight searches, 
justifying them under the administrative search doctrine. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674–75 (1989) (citing three preflight passenger search cases as 
“[a]pplying our precedents dealing with administrative searches”). The Court also spoke 
approvingly of preflight passenger searches in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) 
(“[W]here the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches 
calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports 
and at entrances to courts and other official buildings.” (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674–76 
& n.3)). See also Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 177–81; United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 
615–18 (9th Cir. 2005) (using administrative search balancing tests to justify preflight 
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came to be, how the courts have attempted to expand them so that 
they apply to preflight passenger searches, and why these attempts 
ultimately fail. 
A. The Terry Stop-and-Frisk Search Exception 
1. Terry v. Ohio 
Terry v. Ohio lays out one set of circumstances in which a 
warrantless search of a person by a police officer may be reasonable.40 
In Terry, the defendant was convicted of illegally carrying a 
concealed weapon.41 Over Terry’s objection, the government 
presented as evidence at trial a handgun seized from Terry by a 
police officer.42 The officer testified in a pretrial hearing that after he 
observed Terry behaving suspiciously, the officer believed that Terry 
might have been armed and was preparing to commit a crime.43 The 
officer then approached Terry, identified himself as a police officer, 
and asked Terry for his name.44 When Terry was not completely 
responsive, the officer grabbed him, spun him around, and patted 
down his outer clothing, finding the handgun.45 The trial court 
 
passenger searches). As stated in note 38, the Court has yet to adopt a unified rationale for the 
preflight searches, leading to opinions like Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980), which 
reflect the uncertainty in this part of the law. 
  However, administrative (and “special needs”) searches cannot be logically 
analogized to preflight passenger searches because administrative and “special needs” searches 
are effectively general reasonableness standards in the guise of “exceptions” to the Warrant 
Clause in the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 537 (holding that certain 
suspicionless administrative searches must only be “reasonable” in order to be constitutional, 
with “reasonableness” being determined by a balancing test in which “the [government’s] 
need to search [is weighed] against the invasion which the search entails”). For a greater 
discussion on this topic, see generally Gerald S. Reamey, When “Special Needs” Meet Probable 
Cause: Denying the Devil Benefit of Law, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1992); Scott E. 
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 
MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, “Special Needs” and the Fourth 
Amendment: An Exception Poised To Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997). As discussed above, the history culminating in the Fourth 
Amendment demonstrates the importance of applying a warrant-preference standard—not a 
general reasonableness standard—to the Fourth Amendment. 
 40. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Id. at 4–5. 
 43. Id. at 6. 
 44. Id. at 6–7. 
 45. Id. at 7. 
MINERT.MRO.DOC 2/15/2007 5:27:04 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1640 
upheld the search and seizure, holding that the officer’s experience 
and observations led to a belief that Terry was armed, and that in 
order to protect himself, the officer reasonably “stopped” Terry and 
“frisked” his outer clothing for weapons.46 
The Supreme Court upheld the district court’s decision, holding 
that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and 
that the seized handgun was properly introduced as evidence.47 The 
Court concluded that “in most instances failure to comply with the 
warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent 
circumstances.”48 The Court reasoned that even “a limited search of 
outer clothing” might constitute “a severe, though brief, intrusion 
on cherished personal security.”49 
In light of this background, the Supreme Court in Terry held 
that a search by a law enforcement official for weapons without 
probable cause for arrest is constitutional provided it is “strictly 
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation” and is 
limited to what is necessary to discover weapons that may harm the 
police officer or others nearby.50 The Court reasoned that in order to 
determine the reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure, it is 
necessary to balance the governmental interest or need of the search 
or seizure against the invasion entailed by the search or seizure.51 In 
justifying a particular intrusion, a police officer must “point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts”52 and “in light of [the officer’s] 
experience,”53 would warrant that intrusion.54 In addition, the facts 
must be judged by an objective “reasonable man” standard;55 
“simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not 
enough’”56 because weight must not be given to an “inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”57  
 
 46. Id. at 8. 
 47. Id. at 30–31. 
 48. Id. at 20. 
 49. Id. at 24. 
 50. Id. at 25–26. 
 51. Id. at 20–21. 
 52. Id. at 21. 
 53. Id. at 27. 
 54. Id. at 21. 
 55. Id. at 21, 38. 
 56. Id. at 22 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)). 
 57. Id. at 27. 
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Thus, the Court in Terry held that a police officer having 
reasonable suspicion “to believe that he is dealing with an armed and 
dangerous individual” may, without a warrant, search that individual 
for weapons.58 The officer must base his suspicion upon “specific 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in 
light of his experience” and not an “inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or ‘hunch.’”59 
2. The Terry stop-and-frisk exception applied to preflight passenger 
searches 
One way courts have attempted to justify preflight passenger 
searches is by comparing the search of a metal detector to the Terry 
stop-and-frisk exception to the Warrant Clause in the Fourth 
Amendment.60 In United States v. Epperson, the defendant was 
convicted of violating a federal statute because he was carrying a 
concealed weapon while trying to board an airplane.61 A United 
States Marshal found the weapon after Epperson passed through a 
magnetometer and the magnetometer gave an abnormally high 
reading.62 Epperson moved to exclude the gun as evidence in trial, 
arguing that the magnetometer scan was a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment and that the search was unreasonable because it 
was made without a warrant and did not fall under one of the 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.63 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found 
the magnetometer scan to be a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment,64 but held that the warrantless search was reasonable 
and did not violate Epperson’s Fourth Amendment rights.65 The 
court concluded that while the reason for which the warrant 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); see also United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 
906 n.32 (9th Cir. 1973) (collecting airport search cases and stating that “[m]ost . . . have 
relied upon Terry’s stop-and-frisk rationale or general ‘reasonableness’ to uphold searches 
(including magnetometer scanning) of either the prospective passenger’s person or his carry-on 
luggage” (citations omitted)). 
 61. Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 772. 
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requirement was dispensed in the search of Epperson was not the 
same as the reason in the Terry case,66 the magnetometer search was 
justified because it fell under the same recognized exception to the 
warrant clause as a Terry stop-and-frisk search.67 The court noted 
that “[t]he rationale of Terry is not limited to protection of the 
investigating officer, but extends to ‘others . . . in danger,’”68 and 
reasoned that the minimal invasion of Epperson’s personal privacy by 
a magnetometer was reasonable and fully justifiable in light of the 
government’s interest in discovering weapons and avoiding air 
piracy.69 
3. Why the Terry stop-and-frisk exception fails to justify preflight 
passenger searches 
Even though the Supreme Court’s rationale in Terry might at 
first seem to apply to preflight passenger searches in that “[t]he 
rationale of Terry is not limited to protection of the investigating 
officer, but extends to ‘others . . . in danger,”70 the court in Epperson 
improperly compared a preflight magnetometer search to a Terry 
stop-and-frisk search. While the court did acknowledge that “the 
reason in Terry for dispensing with the ordinary warrant requirement 
is not the same as here,”71 the court should have also acknowledged 
that because the reasoning behind preflight magnetometer searches 
and Terry stop-and-frisk searches is different, the Terry stop-and-frisk 
exception to Fourth Amendment searches cannot, of itself, justify 
preflight magnetometer searches. 
In Terry, even though the police officer did not have probable 
cause to stop and frisk Terry,72 he did observe Terry’s actions for 
some time73 and, based on these observations, had formed a 
reasonable suspicion that Terry might endanger the officer or 
others.74 Thus, the Terry exception is ultimately justified by both the 
need for the safety of police officers and others in danger and the 
 
 66. Id. at 770. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 772 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 
 69. Id. at 771. 
 70. Id. at 772 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). 
 71. Id. at 770. 
 72. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27–28. 
 73. Id. at 6. 
 74. See id. 
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defendant’s observed actions that led to the officer’s reasonable 
suspicion. In Epperson, however, the United States Marshal could 
not have observed Epperson’s actions for any significant length of 
time before Epperson approached the magnetometer,75 and could 
not have found in Epperson’s individual actions a reasonable 
suspicion that Epperson might endanger the Marshal or others.76 
Thus, even though the magnetometer searches might indeed be 
conducted to protect the safety of United States Marshals and the 
general public, they cannot qualify under the Terry exception in the 
Fourth Amendment because the individuals searched do not always 
demonstrate observable actions that would lead to reasonable 
suspicion.77 
This is true even though at least one court has interpreted the 
language in Terry more broadly.
78
 In United States v. Lopez, the 
district court for the Eastern District of New York interpreted Terry 
to instruct as follows: 
A reviewing court must: (1) determine the objective evidence then 
available to the law enforcement officer and (2) decide what level of 
probability existed that the individual was armed and about to 
engage in dangerous conduct; it must then rule whether that level 
of probability justified the ‘frisk’ in light of (3) the manner in 
which the frisk was conducted as bearing on the resentment it 
might justifiably arouse in the person frisked (assuming he is not 
about to engage in criminal conduct) and the community and (4) 
the risk to the officer and the community of not disarming the 
individual at once.
79
 
This reading of Terry might suggest that Terry simply sets forth a 
test balancing the risk to the officer and the community against the 
level of intrusion of a proposed search. Applying this balancing test, 
if hijacking is assumed to be an extremely large risk to the public and 
if airport security searches (such as those provided by metal 
detectors) are considered to be minimally intrusive, then a preflight 
passenger search could be justified under Terry even if there is no 
individualized suspicion. 
 
 75. See Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. at 771. 
 78. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1097 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 79. Id. 
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However, such an interpretation of Terry is overly broad in light 
of the Supreme Court’s conscientiously fact-bound holding in Terry: 
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual 
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons 
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, 
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies 
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where 
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the 
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to 
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
80
 
Additionally, at least one other court has disagreed with the 
Fourth Circuit’s application of the Terry exception in Epperson to 
preflight passenger searches. The Ninth Circuit has stated that 
preflight passenger searches are not justified under the Terry stop-
and-frisk exception to the warrant requirement in the Fourth 
Amendment.81 In United States v. Davis, Davis was convicted of 
carrying a concealed weapon while attempting to board an airplane.82 
An airline employee discovered the weapon in Davis’s briefcase while 
performing a routine, suspicionless search of the carry-on luggage of 
passengers boarding the aircraft.83 The court, while reversing and 
remanding the conviction on other grounds,84 stated that routine, 
suspicionless preflight passenger searches present a wholly different 
problem than Terry searches.85 The court quoted language from the 
Supreme Court reasoning that in a Terry stop-and-frisk search, 
[t]he police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person 
whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before 
he places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he 
must have constitutionally adequate[,] reasonable grounds for 
doing so. In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he 
 
 80. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 81. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 907–08 (9th Cir. 1973) (“Terry does not 
justify the wholesale ‘frisking’ of the general public in order to locate weapons and prevent 
future crimes.”). 
 82. Id. at 895. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 915. 
 85. Id. at 906. 
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must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably 
inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.86 
Therefore, the court held that the Terry decision was inapplicable to 
the case at hand because the airline employee making the search had 
no individual suspicion of Davis.87 
In sum, Terry searches fail to justify preflight passenger searches 
because the Terry search was created with the limited purpose of 
protecting police officers who reasonably and objectively suspected 
that an individual was about to act illegally in a manner that would 
endanger the officers or others nearby. Some courts have attempted 
to apply Terry searches to preflight passenger searches, but this 
analysis fails because preflight passenger searches are almost always 
made without reasonable and individualized suspicion, an essential 
requirement of Terry searches. In addition, this misapplied Terry 
exception conflicts with individual constitutional rights by setting a 
precedent in which the government can not only make warrantless 
searches without probable cause, but can also make warrantless 
searches without reasonable or individualized suspicion. 
B. The Consent Exception 
1. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 
The Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte outlined the 
consent exception: voluntary consent to a Fourth Amendment search 
or seizure can make a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.88 In 
Schneckloth, Bustamonte was charged with the possession of a check 
with the intent to defraud.89 A police officer pulled over a car in 
which Bustamonte and five others were riding for a minor traffic 
violation.90 Because the driver did not have a driver’s license and 
because only one of the six men had identification, the officer asked 
 
 86. Id. at 906 n.35 (citation omitted) (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 
(1968)). 
 87. Id. at 907 (“[The airline employee] had no individualized basis for the search at all, 
much less specific and articulable facts that would justify a reasonably prudent man in believing 
that [Davis] was about to commit a crime or that he was carrying a weapon.”). 
 88. 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). 
 89. Id. at 220. 
 90. Id. 
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the men to exit the car.91 The officer asked one of Bustamonte’s 
companions, whose brother owned the car, if the officer could search 
the car.92 Bustamonte’s companion agreed and even helped the 
officer search the car’s trunk.93 The officer found three checks, which 
had been stolen from a car wash, wadded up under the back seat.94 
At trial, Bustamonte moved to have the evidence suppressed, 
asserting that it was acquired through a search and seizure that 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.95 
The Supreme Court in Schneckloth began its discussion by 
affirming that searches conducted pursuant to valid consent are 
constitutionally permissible, with the government bearing the 
burden to prove that the consent was “freely and voluntarily 
given.”96 The consent must be made free of coercion, “[f]or, no 
matter how subtly the coercion [is] applied, the resulting ‘consent’ 
would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion 
against which the Fourth Amendment is directed.”97 However, the 
Court reasoned that even though the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments limit the circumstances under which the government 
may conduct a search, a person’s voluntary allowance of a search is 
not constitutionally suspect.98 The Court indicated that the question 
of whether consent to a search is voluntary or is the product of 
express or implied coercion or duress is a question of fact that is 
determined by the totality of the circumstances.99 In addition, the 
Court asserted that even though “knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent is one factor” to be considered, the government does not 
need to establish this knowledge as an indispensable element of 
effective consent.100  
 
 91. See id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. at 219. 
 96. Id. at 222 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). 
 97. Id. at 228. 
 98. Id. at 242–43. 
 99. Id. at 227. 
 100. Id. 
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2. The consent exception applied to preflight passenger searches 
 The Supreme Court of Florida has applied the consent exception 
to a preflight passenger search.101 In Shapiro v. State, the defendant 
was convicted for possession of cocaine.102 The cocaine was 
discovered by a detective after Shapiro’s suitcase went through an x-
ray machine at an airport.103 Shapiro moved to exclude the cocaine as 
evidence at trial, arguing that the government acquired the cocaine 
by a search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 
because the detective lacked sufficient probable cause when he 
searched Shapiro’s suitcase.104 
The court held that in light of the totality of the circumstances, 
Shapiro voluntarily consented to the search of his suitcase,105 
reasoning that one exception to the probable cause requirement in 
the Fourth Amendment is a search that is conducted pursuant to 
free, unconstrained, and voluntary consent.106 Citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, the court acknowledged that “while knowledge of the 
right to refuse consent is a factor to be taken into account, the 
government need not establish such knowledge as an indispensable 
requisite to effective consent.”107 The court found that Shapiro 
voluntarily consented to having his suitcase searched because he 
knew that he was required to submit to a security search upon 
entering the airport’s boarding area.108 In addition, the court found 
that Shapiro knew that he was not required to go through the 
security checkpoint, board the airplane, or carry his suitcase onto the 
plane.109 Because Shapiro chose to go through the security 
checkpoint, board the airplane, and carry his suitcase onto the plane, 
he consented to the search of himself and his baggage.110 
 
 101. Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980). 
 102. Id. at 346. 
 103. Id. at 347. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 348. 
 106. Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Norman v. State, 379 
So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980)). 
 107. Id. (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241–42). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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3. Why the consent exception fails to justify preflight passenger searches 
The consent exception in the Fourth Amendment fails to justify 
preflight passenger searches because consent, particularly “implied” 
consent in the preflight search context, really just forces a person to 
choose between his or her Fourth Amendment rights and his or her 
constitutional right to travel.111 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit discussed this issue in United States v. Kroll.112 
In Kroll, the defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance.113 For some unstated reason, Kroll, while attempting to 
board an airplane, met the profile of a hijacker.114 As a result, a 
United States Marshal conducted a search of Kroll's attaché.115 This 
search resulted in the discovery of a small amount of amphetamine 
and a partially consumed marijuana cigarette, which was found in an 
ordinary white business envelope.116 
Kroll moved to exclude the evidence at an evidentiary hearing; 
the government objected, arguing that the warrantless search was 
reasonable in part because Kroll consented to the search.117 The 
district court granted Kroll’s motion to suppress the evidence, 
holding that although it was reasonable to search Kroll’s attaché case 
for weapons and explosives,118 the envelope’s contents were not 
reasonably inspected.119 The district court reasoned that while “as a 
general proposition . . . an inspection search of an airline passenger’s 
carry-on luggage for the limited purpose of protecting lives and 
property from weapons and explosives is not unreasonable at its 
inception[,] . . . [t]his must not be interpreted, however, as license 
for the wholesale exploration of a passenger’s luggage and its 
contents.”120 
 
 111. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (“The word ‘travel’ is not found in the 
text of the Constitution. Yet the ‘constitutional right to travel from one State to another’ is 
firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.” (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 
(1966))); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1868).  
 112. 481 F.2d 884 (1973). 
 113. Id. at 885. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 885–86. 
 117. Id. at 886. 
 118. United States v. Kroll (Kroll I), 351 F. Supp. 148, 152 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff’d, 
481 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 119. United States v. Kroll (Kroll II), 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973). 
 120. Kroll I, 351 F. Supp. at 152 (emphasis omitted). 
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In reviewing the district court’s decision, the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed that the government had the burden of proving that 
“consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given.”121 The 
government attempted to prove Kroll’s consent by noting the 
warnings which were posted to advise passengers at the airport that 
they were subject to a search prior to boarding an aircraft.122 The 
government argued that “[w]here a person is clearly warned in 
advance that he will be searched and he still has time to withdraw as 
[Kroll] did here, his conduct in seeking to board the plane must be 
inferred to include a free, voluntary and intelligent consent to be 
searched.”123 The circuit court disagreed, and, upholding the district 
court’s ruling to suppress the evidence, found that Kroll’s actions did 
not constitute consent “in any meaningful sense.”124 The court 
reasoned that “[c]ompelling [Kroll] to choose between exercising 
Fourth Amendment rights and his right to travel constitutes 
coercion; the government cannot be said to have established that 
[Kroll] freely and voluntarily consent[ed] to the search when to do 
otherwise would have meant foregoing the constitutional right to 
travel.”125 The court found unpersuasive the argument that Kroll 
would not have been actually deprived of his travel rights because 
alternative means to travel were available.126 The court reasoned that 
“in many situations, flying may be the only practical means of 
transportation.”127 
In sum, the consent exception in the Fourth Amendment was 
originally created for situations in which the person searched 
knowingly and voluntarily consents to the search by a distinct 
affirmative or implied action. At least one court has attempted to 
apply the consent exception to preflight passenger searches, but this 
analysis fails because persons subjected to preflight passenger 
searches do not truly consent through an affirmative or implied 
action, but are forced to consent in order to access their 
 
 121. Kroll II, 481 F.2d at 886 (quoting Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 
(1968)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 886 n.2. 
 127. Id. (quoting Patrick W. McGinley & Stephen F. Downs, Airport Searches and 
Seizures—A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 322 (1972)). 
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constitutional right to travel.128 In addition, this misapplied consent 
exception conflicts with individual constitutional rights by creating a 
precedent in which the government may use consent as a pretext for 
an unreasonable warrantless search or seizure in which no voluntary 
consent is truly given. 
C. The Katz “Expectation of Privacy” Exception 
1. Katz v. United States 
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States outlined how an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy affects Fourth 
Amendment searches and seizures.129 In Katz, the defendant was 
convicted of transmitting gambling information by telephone in 
violation of a federal statute.130 Over Katz’s objection, the 
government was permitted to introduce evidence of his phone 
conversations at trial.131 The government gained the evidence from 
FBI agents who overheard Katz’s telephone conversations on a 
public pay phone by attaching an electronic listening device to the 
outside of the phone booth.132 The appellate court affirmed the 
conviction, holding that the surveillance did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because the agents did not physically enter the phone 
booth.133 
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the 
government violated Katz’s Fourth Amendment rights through an 
illegal search and seizure.134 However, the Court refused to decide if 
a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area, finding: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what 
 
 128. Cf. Airport Searches, supra note 4, at 152 (“The Supreme Court has held, in other 
contexts, that the exercise of one constitutional right may not be conditioned on the waiver of 
another.” (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972))). 
 129. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 130. Id. at 348. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 349 (quoting Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966)). 
 134. Id. at 359. 
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he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.135 
The Court further held that Katz justifiably expected privacy while 
using the phone booth, so the government’s eavesdropping 
comprised a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.136 
The Court reasoned that the fact that the listening device did not 
penetrate the phone booth’s wall was not constitutionally significant 
because the Fourth Amendment extends to the recording of verbal 
statements, even if they are overheard without a technical trespass.137 
Finally, Justice Harlan introduced a privacy test in his 
concurrence which is still referenced today.138 According to Justice 
Harlan’s reading of prior Supreme Court decisions, “there is a 
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”139 
Justice Harlan used a person’s home as an example of a place where 
an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but 
stated that objects, statements, or activities a person exposes in plain 
view of others are not protected by a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.140 
 
 135. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). 
 136. Id. at 353. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 
(2001) (“As Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence described it, a Fourth Amendment search 
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes 
as reasonable. We have subsequently applied this principle to hold that a Fourth Amendment 
search does not occur—even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned—
unless ‘the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the 
challenged search,’ and ‘society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’” 
(citations omitted)); United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test, as articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence, was 
adopted by a majority of the Court a little over a decade later.” (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979))); State v. Gonzalez, 898 A.2d 149, 155 & n.11 (Conn. 2006) 
(“Although the term ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ originated in Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Katz v. United States . . . , it has since gained widespread acceptance in 
both state and federal jurisprudence.” (citations omitted)). 
 139. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 140. Id. 
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2. The Katz privacy test applied to preflight passenger searches 
The Supreme Court of Florida has applied the Katz privacy test 
to preflight passenger searches.141 In Shapiro v. State, discussed 
above, the Florida Supreme Court upheld Shapiro’s conviction for 
possession of cocaine.142 As an alternative143 to its rationale that 
Shapiro had consented to the preflight search, the court stated that 
for Shapiro to demonstrate that his Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated, he would need to show that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy and that society recognized that expectation as 
reasonable.144 The court held that Shapiro failed to show that he had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy because his own testimony 
showed that he had boarded planes many times and that he knew 
that his carry-on luggage must be inspected at a designated 
checkpoint in every airport.145 Additionally, the court held that even 
if Shapiro had an expectation of privacy, society would not recognize 
that expectation as reasonable.146 The court reasoned that “[a]t this 
point in time when airplane hijacking is at a crisis level, such an 
expectation, to be free from the limited intrusion brought about by 
the screening process utilized in the boarding area of the airports, is 
not justifiable under the circumstances.”147 The court further 
reasoned that a person who enters an airport boarding area is given 
notice by signs posted in boarding areas and should know that he or 
she is subject to a search for weapons or other materials that could 
be used to hijack an airplane.148 
3. Why the Katz privacy test fails to justify preflight passenger searches 
The Katz privacy test—in which the court is forced to determine 
whether an individual has an expectation of privacy and whether 
 
 141. Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980). 
 142. Id. at 346. 
 143. The Shapiro court offered three rationales that purportedly justified the search: that 
the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his carry-on baggage, id. at 347–48; 
that the defendant consented to the search, id. at 348; and that the government’s interest in 
searching the defendant’s suitcase justified the “minimal” intrusion under a general 
reasonableness approach, id. at 348–50. 
 144. Id. at 347 (additional citations omitted) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. 347). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 347–48. 
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society deems that “reasonable”149—fails to justify preflight passenger 
searches because, as Justice Harlan himself later stated in United 
States v. White, “[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in 
large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and 
values of the past and present.”150 Thus, an individual’s expectation 
of privacy might not be “individual” or “subjective” at all—it might 
be an expectation forced upon him or her or shaped by the 
government through the passage of laws.151  
A prime example of this is the Supreme Court of Florida’s 
decision in Shapiro.152 The court held that Shapiro did not exhibit an 
expectation of privacy because “he was aware that there is a 
checkpoint at every airport where carry-on baggage must be 
submitted for inspection.”153 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Davis provides another example.154 The court stated that, 
“as a matter of constitutional law, a prospective passenger has a 
choice: he may submit to a search of his person and immediate 
possessions as a condition to boarding; or he may turn around and 
leave.”155 Neither of these decisions leaves room for any kind of 
individual subjective expectation, but rather projects the 
government’s demand for diminished privacy in certain contexts 
onto the individual. 
In addition, the Katz privacy test has fallen out of favor with at 
least a few courts because it does not adequately represent Fourth 
Amendment protections.156 The Supreme Court in Smith v. 
 
 149. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 150. 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971). 
 151. As one scholar stated, under the Katz expectation test, “the government could 
diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on 
television that . . . we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic 
surveillance.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 384 (1974). 
 152. 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980). 
 153. Id. at 347. 
 154. 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 905 n.30 (“Justice Harlan’s first condition would not appear to be 
universally applicable. The traditional protection afforded to the home under the Fourth 
Amendment could not be denied to a particular homeowner because he mistakenly supposed 
that government agents might enter whenever they pleased.”). In addition, the Supreme Court 
has concluded that the second prong of the Katz test (that the expectation of privacy be one 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable) is much more important than the first (that 
there is an actual subjective expectation of privacy). See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
525 n.7 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (stating that the Fourth 
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Maryland lists an example where the two-part Katz privacy test 
might fall short of Fourth Amendment standards: “For example, if 
the government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television 
that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, 
individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual 
expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.”157 
Such a situation would be improper because the warrantless entry of 
personal homes without probable cause violates the very protection 
of privacy premised by the Fourth Amendment.158 Concerning 
preflight passenger searches, under the reasoning of Smith v. 
Maryland, the Ninth Circuit in Davis also inadequately represented 
Fourth Amendment protections when it held that passengers have 
the constitutional choice to either submit to searches or leave.159 
In sum, the Katz privacy test was originally created in light of 
the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy.160 At least one court has 
attempted to expand the Katz privacy test by improperly applying it 
to preflight passenger searches, but this analysis fails because the 
court denies the possibility that an individual might have a 
subjective, individual expectation of privacy at an airport and instead 
projects onto that individual an expectation of privacy that has been 
created through government practice.161 In addition, the improper 
application and expansion of the Katz privacy test conflicts with 
individual constitutional rights by creating a precedent in which the 
government can justify unreasonable warrantless searches and 
seizures by simply declaring that, in certain circumstances, a searched 
individual does not have an expectation of privacy. 
 
Amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those 
“expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))). 
 157. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979). 
 158. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated 
. . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 159. Davis, 482 F.2d at 913. 
 160. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 161. Shapiro v. State, 390 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1980). 
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D. The Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment 
1. United States v. Ramsey 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Ramsey outlined the 
longstanding right of the United States to protect itself by carrying 
out border searches.162 In Ramsey, the defendants were convicted of 
narcotics offenses.163 After customs officials gained “reasonable cause 
to suspect” a violation of certain customs statutes, they opened and 
inspected, without a search warrant, incoming international mail 
meant for the defendants and discovered narcotics.164 Against the 
defendants’ objection, the government admitted the narcotics as 
evidence at trial, and the defendants were found guilty.165 
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the 
customs officer’s warrantless search was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.166 The Court commented that it should not require an 
extended demonstration to show that “searches made at the border, 
pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself 
by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this 
country, are reasonable . . . .”167 The Court reasoned that the same 
Congress that proposed the Fourth Amendment also enacted the 
first customs statute, which gave customs officers “full power and 
authority” to search vessels which they suspected were concealing 
goods subject to duties.168 The court distinguished this “plenary 
customs power” from searches of “any particular dwelling-house, 
store, building, or other place” where a search warrant based upon 
probable cause was required.169 The Court further reasoned that, 
even before the Fourth Amendment was adopted, border searches 
have been considered reasonable and have never needed the 
additional requirement of reasonableness or the existence of 
 
 162. 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
 163. United States v. Ramsey, 538 F.2d 415, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d, 431 U.S. 606 
(1977). 
 164. 431 U.S. at 607, 610. 
 165. See id. at 610–11. 
 166. Id. at 615–16. 
 167. Id. at 616. 
 168. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 
Stat. 29). 
 169. Id. (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29). 
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probable cause to be constitutional because of the sole fact that the 
individual or article in question has entered the country from the 
outside.170 “This longstanding recognition that searches at our 
borders without probable cause and without a warrant are 
nonetheless ‘reasonable’ has a history as old as the Fourth 
Amendment itself.”171 
2. The border search exception applied to preflight passenger searches 
In United States v. Nates, the Ninth Circuit expressly held that the 
border search exception, which generally is applied only to searches of 
persons entering the United States, also applies to persons exiting the 
United States.172 In that case, Nates was convicted of attempting to 
smuggle over $100,000 onto an international flight departing for 
Colombia in violation of a currency reporting law.173 While making a 
general baggage search, a United States customs agent selected two 
of Nates’s bags for inspection to determine if Nates was attempting 
to take large amounts of unreported currency from the country.174 
The agent “selected Nates’ two bags for inspection because they 
were new (one still b[ore] a price tag), had no passenger name tag, 
and were unusually heavy.”175 Nates moved to suppress the evidence 
procured by the search, and argued on appeal that it was acquired by 
an unconstitutional search.176 
In determining the constitutionality of the currency reporting 
law, the Ninth Circuit began its analysis by noting, “The border 
search exception to the fourth amendment, which allows a search to 
be initiated without a warrant, probable cause or articulable 
suspicion, applies to exit searches.”177 The court noted that the rule 
applying the border search exception to a search of a person exiting a 
 
 170. Id. at 619. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 831 F.2d 860, 862 (1987). For further discussion of the so-called “reverse” border 
exception, see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 451–52 (7th ed. West 2004) (citing United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791 (5th 
Cir. 1991); Nates, 831 F.2d at 863 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); United States v. Duncan, 693 
F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1982)).  
 173. Nates, 831 F.2d at 861. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 862 (citations ommitted).  
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United States border has been criticized, but not overruled.178 
However, the court then specifically stated, “This circuit holds that a 
suspicionless exit border search is constitutional.”179 Based upon this 
analysis, the Ninth Circuit determined that the currency reporting 
law, requiring reasonable cause for suspicion, was constitutional.180 
In United States v. Skipwith, the Fifth Circuit has held that 
passengers presenting themselves to board airliners can be searched 
according to border search standards—“mere or unsupported 
suspicion.”181 In that case, Skipwith was convicted of drug possession 
after a preflight passenger search revealed he was carrying cocaine.182 
A deputy United States marshal made a warrantless search of 
Skipwith because he matched the Federal Aviation Administration 
anti-skyjack profile, claimed not to have identification, appeared to 
be very nervous, and may have been under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol.183 Skipwith moved to suppress the evidence procured by the 
search at trial, arguing it was acquired by an unconstitutional 
search.184 
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by noting that, in light of the 
widespread publicity of the government’s efforts to avoid aircraft 
piracy, Skipwith should have known he was subject to a preflight 
search once he attempted to board a plane.185 The court also noted, 
“Necessity alone, however, whether produced by danger or 
otherwise, does not in itself make all non-probable-cause searches 
reasonable.”186 To calculate the reasonableness of preflight passenger 
searches, the court outlined three factors to be considered: “public 
necessity, efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion.”187 The 
court determined, “Our conclusion, after this tripartite weighing of 
the relevant factors, is that the standards for initiating a search of a 
person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent than those 
 
 178. Id. (citing United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 983–94 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting); United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 503–04 (9th Cir. 1984), 
vacated in part, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (1973). 
 182. Id. at 1273. 
 183. Id. at 1273–74. 
 184. Id. at 1273. 
 185. Id. at 1273–74. 
 186. Id. at 1275. 
 187. Id. 
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applied in border crossing situations.”188 The court held that “those 
who actually present themselves for boarding on an air carrier, like 
those seeking entrance into the country, are subject to a search based 
on mere or unsupported suspicion.”189 The court also stated that 
reasonableness does not limit officers to searching only passengers 
who match a certain profile or who appear nervous or suspicious.190 
3. Why the border search exception fails to justify preflight passenger 
searches 
In light of the holdings in Nates191 and Skipwith,192 the 
temptation naturally appears to apply the border search exception to 
preflight passenger searches of all departing flights—both 
international and domestic. While it is not disputed that the border 
search exception in the Fourth Amendment applies to passengers of 
international flights entering the United States, the border search 
exception cannot be rationally stretched to justify all preflight 
passenger searches conducted at airports. The border search 
exception applies to arriving international flights because the airports 
at which international flights arrive become “‘functional 
equivalent[s]’ of the border.”193 Thus, searches of an arriving 
international traveler are reasonable because it can be shown by more 
than just probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the traveler 
crossed a United States border.194 However, the vast majority of 
flights departing or arriving in United States airports do not cross 
international borders. Consequently, the border search exception in 
the Fourth Amendment cannot apply to purely domestic flights. 
Even more than the sovereign right of the United States to 
protect itself,195 the essence of the “border search” exception is “the 
single fact that the person or item in question had entered into [the 
 
 188. Id. at 1276. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. 831 F.2d 860, 862 (1987). 
 192. 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (1973). 
 193. See United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Niver, 689 F.2d 520, 525–26 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that an airport may act as the 
“functional equivalent of the border”). 
 194. See Niver, 689 F.2d at 526. 
 195. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). 
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United States] from outside.”196 Thus, while the border search 
exception may be justified at a border or its functional equivalent by 
this “single fact” alone,197 the exception cannot apply when a border 
crossing into this country is not reasonably certain.198 In United 
States v. Ramsey, discussed above, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed this issue. The Court reasoned as follows: 
Travellers [sic] may be . . . stopped [without a warrant and without 
suspicion] in crossing an international boundary because of 
national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the 
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his 
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those 
lawfully within the country . . . have a right to free passage without 
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official 
authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their 
vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.199 
In sum, the border search exception in the Fourth Amendment 
was originally created because of the right of the United States, as a 
sovereign nation, to protect itself by searching those that seek to 
enter its borders. Some courts have analogized the border search 
exception to preflight passenger searches occurring at airports that 
act as functional equivalents to borders,200 but the border search 
exception cannot be expanded to justify preflight searches of 
passengers embarking on purely domestic flights. Such an improper 
application of the border search exception would conflict with 
individual constitutional rights by creating a precedent in which the 
government may conduct a warrantless search or seizure for reasons 
inconsistent with those originally justifying the border search 
exception. 
In review, United States courts have expanded four “traditional” 
exceptions to the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment by 
unnaturally applying them to preflight passenger searches. These 
misapplied exceptions include the Terry stop-and-frisk exception,201 
 
 196. Id. at 619. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Niver, 689 F.2d at 526. 
 199. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925)). 
 200. See United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1982); Niver, 689 F.2d 
at 525–26.  
 201. See supra Part III.A. 
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the consent exception,202 the Katz expectation of privacy 
exception,203 and the border search exception.204 However, the 
application of any of these four exceptions to preflight searches is 
ultimately not justified. Preflight searches do not qualify as Terry 
stop-and-frisk searches because they are usually made without 
individualized suspicion; the searches cannot be authorized by 
consent because the air traveler has no realistic choice but to submit; 
the searches do not fall under the Katz privacy test because the 
government should not tell its citizens what their reasonable 
expectation of privacy should be (a problem with the Katz test 
generally); and the searches do not qualify under the border 
exception because most preflight passenger searches are not made at 
any United States border or functional equivalent. Additionally, 
misapplied exceptions in the Fourth Amendment conflict with 
individual constitutional rights by creating precedents in which the 
government may make unreasonable warrantless searches and 
seizures. 
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFYING 
PREFLIGHT PASSENGER SEARCHES UNDER  
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
As this Comment shows, preflight searches cannot be logically 
justified under the current exceptions to the Warrant Clause in the 
Fourth Amendment. Consequently, this Part calls upon the Supreme 
Court to create a sui generis exception to the warrant requirement in 
the Fourth Amendment in order to constitutionally justify preflight 
passenger searches. 
Even though warrantless preflight passenger searches do not 
neatly fit into any of the long-established and accepted categories of 
warrantless searches considered reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, in light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 
most people would likely believe it undesirable to allow all airline 
passengers to forego security screening.205 Chief Judge Friendly, in 
 
 202. See supra Part III.B. 
 203. See supra Part III.C. 
 204. See supra Part III.D. 
 205. See, e.g., Marilyn Adams, Most Flyers Accept Intrusion in the Name of Security, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2006-09-06-accepting 
-intrusions_x.htm (reporting Gallup Poll data that 70% of those polled “say none of the 
security measures used in airports should be stopped”).  
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his concurring remarks in United States v. Bell, stated, “When the 
risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of 
dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large 
airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness.”206 
However, general public awareness and approval of preflight 
passenger searches do not, of themselves, provide legal justification 
for the searches. As Justice Powell of the Supreme Court reminded 
us in United States v. United States District Court, “[g]iven the 
difficulty of defining the domestic security interest, the danger of 
abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent.”207  
Consequently, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a 
preflight passenger search case
208
 and create a sui generis exception 
to the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment, based upon the 
longstanding need to create greater rationality and unity in this area 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.209 This exception would only 
apply to mass transportation systems accessible to the public, where 
security screening for weapons is necessary because the danger of 
terrorism is abnormally great. 
The Supreme Court should consider the inherent physical 
characteristics of public mass transportation when crafting the 
boundaries of this new exception. Identifying these characteristics 
will assist the Court in determining which forms of mass 
transportation accessible to the public should be covered by the 
proposed exception.210 In addition, specifically tying the physical 
characteristics of public mass transportation systems to the 
parameters of the exception will make the exception less likely to be 
misapplied in non-mass transportation situations. Currently, airlines, 
passenger trains, subways, buses, and possibly automobile taxis are 
the principal forms of mass public transportation employed in the 
United States. 
 
 206. 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
 207. 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972). 
 208. The uncertainty in this area of the law remains timely, as evidenced by the recent 
case of United States v. Hartwell. 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 111 
(2006); see supra note 38. The Court had the opportunity to resolve the unsettled law in 
preflight passenger searches by granting certiorari, but declined to do so.  
 209. See Amar, supra note 7, at 758 (describing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as “a 
vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but 
often perverse”).  
 210. The Court would, of course, be well-advised to consider data gathered by experts in 
making these determinations in order to best create a narrowly tailored exception. 
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 One inherent characteristic of some forms of public mass 
transportation is a substantial likelihood of considerable loss of 
human life in the event of a terrorist attack. Factors such as the 
passenger carrying capacity of each type of public mass transportation 
vehicle, the speeds available to and maneuverability of the vehicle, 
and the capacity of the vehicle itself to be used as weapon will be 
important in determining the potential loss of human life in a 
terrorist attack.211 
 A second inherent characteristic of mass transportation systems 
available to the public concerns the degree of difficulty the 
government would encounter in an attempt to stop a hijacking 
before the transportation vehicle is utilized as a terrorist weapon. 
The question becomes, at exactly what point is the last clear chance 
to prevent the destruction of life and property that would result from 
a terrorist attack carried out on a particular form of transportation?212 
When the last clear chance to avoid such destruction occurs prior to 
the departure of the public transportation vehicle, the difficulty in 
stopping a terrorist attack occurring after departure may be so great 
as to become a practical impossibility.213 Thus, in modes of 
transportation where the last clear chance to prevent mass 
 
 211. In formulating the exception, it may be useful to the Court to consider the number 
of lives lost as a result of the most historically destructive terrorist attacks involving particular 
forms of transportation. See, e.g., U.S. Deaths in Iraq, War on Terror Surpass 9/11 Toll, 
CNN.com, Sept. 3 2006, http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/03/death 
.toll/ (stating the 9/11 toll as 2973, “including Americans and foreign nationals but excluding 
the terrorists”); Associated Press, Madrid Bomb Death Toll Lowered to 190, MSNBC.com, Mar. 
23, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4502950/ (190 deaths reported from March 11, 
2004 bombing of commuter train in Madrid). 
 212. In tort law, society has recognized the significance of a party’s last clear chance to 
prevent damage to life and property. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 897–98 (8th ed. 2004). 
 213. Reflecting the practical difficulty a government would experience in an attempt to 
halt hijacked aircraft, some nations, such as Poland and Germany, have passed statutes 
permitting the military to shoot down hijacked aircraft as a last resort. BBC NEWS, Poland To 
Down Hijacked Aircraft, Jan. 13, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4172487.stm; 
see also United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Little can be done to 
balk the malefactor after [weapons or explosives are] successfully smuggled aboard.” (alteration 
in original) (quoting United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir.1973))). In contrast, 
law enforcement officials have been able to stop hijacked busses on several occasions. See, e.g., 
Richard Cowen & Justo Bautista, Police Arrest 7 in Jitney Hijacking, RECORD (Bergen 
County, N.J.), Nov. 3, 2006, at L.01 (hijacked jitney bus stopped after police vehicle blocked 
its path); Man Arrested After 70-Mile Bus Hijacking in San Diego, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1997, 
at 17 (hijacked bus rolled to stop soon after running over spike-strip laid by police). But see Bus 
Hijacker Killed After Chase Covers 320 Miles of Desert, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1992, at A15 
(spikes set by police cause several flat tires on hijacked bus but fail to stop bus). 
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destruction to life and property occurs prior to the departure of the 
vehicle, warrantless searches of boarding passengers would be more 
justified than in modes of transportation where an attack 
commenced after the departure of the vehicle would be more easily 
thwarted. 
 A third inherent characteristic of public mass transportation 
concerns the substantial likelihood that a terrorist attack will have a 
crippling effect on the public mass transit system and associated 
public infrastructure. Depending upon the type of transportation 
vehicle involved in the terrorist attack and the extent of potential 
damage to property, widespread paralyzation of certain public mass 
transportation systems may occur.214 
However, the Supreme Court should consider more than just the 
inherent physical characteristics of public mass transportation when 
crafting the boundaries of this new exception—the Court should 
consider further guidelines to ensure the exception is at least 
somewhat resistant to misapplication. That is, the Court should 
strive to create an exception that is narrowly tailored to prevent it 
from being applied in situations where such a search would not be 
justified.  
One guideline that would facilitate the narrow tailoring of the 
exception is that it should be applicable, by its terms, to a specific 
and limited factual context. The factual situation covered by the 
exception should involve only that where passengers present 
themselves to board certain mass transportation systems available to 
the public that are especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The 
exception should be further tailored to a specific purpose—which, in 
this case, would be to search for items that potentially can be used to 
carry out a terrorist attack. 
 A second guideline that would facilitate the narrow tailoring of 
the proposed exception is that the searches authorized by it would 
 
 214. See WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, JR., COMPTROLLER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ONE 
YEAR LATER, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF 9/11 ON NEW YORK CITY 2 (2002), available at 
http://comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bud/reports/impact-9-11-year-later.pdf (estimating, as 
a result of the 9/11 attacks, a $4.3 billion loss in infrastructure—including trains, telephone 
service, and electricity—to New York City); NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON 
THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 292, 326 (2004), available at 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (noting the closing of subway 
stations and major thoroughfares on 9/11 and that “[f]or the first time in history, all 
nonemergency civilian aircraft in the United States were grounded, stranding tens of thousands 
of passengers across the country”). 
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be permitted to be only as intrusive as necessary to attain the 
government’s stated purpose (detecting terrorist weapons).215 The 
exception should also take into account advances in technology, such 
that the intrusive nature of the search may decrease or increase 
depending on advances in technology by terrorists and/or the 
government.216 
 A third guideline that will facilitate the narrow tailoring of the 
proposed exception is that the new exception should fit as seamlessly 
as possible within current search and seizure practice and 
jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment. In making this 
assessment, the Court should give deference, as it did in Ramsey, to 
searches that have been a longstanding historical practice.217 An 
exception that does not dramatically alter the status quo is preferable 
because it will not disturb other, possibly long-upheld, legal 
principles. 
Presently, applying the above guidelines would seem to dictate 
that the proposed sui generis exception should be confined to 
preflight passenger searches at airports. Indeed, preflight passenger 
searches have existed for decades. Additionally, if limited to preflight 
passenger searches for objects potentially used to carry out a terrorist 
attack, the proposed exception would also comport with the 
guideline that the proposed exception be narrowly tailored. Thus, 
the exception would ensure that searches necessary to public safety 
are not applied to situations where they are not justified. 
Concluding that the proposed exception would apply only to 
preflight passenger searches also comports with accepted societal 
practice, as expressed by Justice Souter in United States v. Drayton: 
 
 215. The requirement that searches and stops be tailored to their stated purpose is not 
foreign to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 
(2004) (police automobile checkpoint stop “appropriately tailored” to fit need to seek 
information from public about “hit and run” that occurred about one week before); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified 
by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” (citations omitted)). 
 216. See, e.g., Jon Hilkevitch, Airline is Adding to Cockpit Security, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 
2004, at 13, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/technology/chi-0409010159 
sep01,1,6776422.story?coll=chi-techtopheds-hed (describing bulletproof, FAA-approved steel 
barriers installed in United Airlines aircraft “that can be quickly fastened across front aisles of 
planes to protect pilots from attacks when the cockpit door is opened during flight”). 
 217. See supra notes 162–71 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s deference to 
the longstanding practice of border searches). 
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 Anyone who travels by air today submits to searches of the 
person and luggage as a condition of boarding the aircraft. It is 
universally accepted that such intrusions are necessary to hedge 
against risks that, nowadays, even small children understand. The 
commonplace precautions of air travel have not, thus far, been 
justified for ground transportation . . . and no such conditions have 
been placed on passengers getting on trains or buses.218 
 However, while the proposed exception is narrowly tailored to 
avoid misapplication, expressly incorporating the inherent 
characteristics of public mass transportation into the exception allows 
for the possibility that changes in technology or other circumstances 
might qualify other forms of mass public transportation for the 
exception outlined here. As other forms meet the proper 
requirements, they naturally will bring themselves into the exception, 
rather than forcing the exception to expand to include them. Thus, 
the exception will have the safeguards of a narrowly tailored 
construction while remaining open to the possibility of future 
change. 
 Finally, justifying preflight passenger searches through the 
creation of a sui generis exception would promote logical consistency 
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Ideally, the Terry stop-and-
frisk search will again only be applied to police officers who observe 
suspicious activity, the consent exception will again only be applied 
to truly voluntary actions, the Katz privacy analysis may again 
determine the existence of privacy expectations rather than 
projecting governmental expectations of privacy on the public, and 
the border search exception will again only be applied at borders or 
their true functional equivalents. 
 Most importantly, as exceptions in the Fourth Amendment 
return to their rational foundations, the warrant requirement and 
judicial review may be sustained in their proper role in the 
Amendment. Ideally, Fourth Amendment interpretation will reach 
the day when, in the words of James Madison, “independent 
tribunals of justice . . . will be naturally led to resist every 
 
 218. 536 U.S. 194, 208 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). But see generally Keeley, supra 
note 4 (considering which Fourth Amendment exception(s) may justify suspicionless searches 
of passengers boarding subways). 
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encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the 
Constitution . . . .”219 
In review, the prevailing constitutional approach attempts to 
misapply certain widely accepted exceptions to the warrant clause in 
the Fourth Amendment in an effort to justify preflight searches of 
passengers boarding airliners. A more effective and protective 
constitutional approach would be to create a sui generis exception to 
the Warrant Clause in the Fourth Amendment which is narrowly 
tailored to ensure that searches necessary to public safety are not 
misapplied to other situations in conflict with individual 
constitutional rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Individual constitutional rights make up the heart of liberty in 
the United States. While the United States must support efforts to 
detect and deter terrorism in this modern era, such efforts must not 
be made at the expense of these liberties. 
This Comment shows that the history culminating in the Fourth 
Amendment demonstrates the importance of judicial review of 
searches by law enforcement officials—and consequently a warrant-
preference standard—in the Amendment. In light of this 
requirement, courts have attempted to analogize accepted Fourth 
Amendment exceptions to preflight passenger searches through the 
Terry stop-and-frisk exception, the consent exception, the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy exception, and the border search 
exception.220 However, this Comment also shows that these 
unnatural applications are improper because they fail to provide a 
logical constitutional foundation for preflight passenger searches. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court should create a sui generis 
exception to the warrant clause in the Fourth Amendment that is 
narrowly tailored to ensure that searches truly necessary to public 
safety are not misapplied to other situations in which government 
intrusion into personal security is not justified. Thus, all exceptions 
to the warrant clause in the Fourth Amendment, including the 
proposed exception, would be made only in proper factual 
 
 219. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961) (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834)). 
 220. See supra Part III. 
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circumstances and would be conscientiously limited to provide the 
least possible intrusion on individual constitutional rights. 
Steven R. Minert 
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